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Central bankers’ conventional wisdom suggests that nominal interest rates should
be raised to implement a lower inflation target. In contrast, I show that the stan-
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1 Introduction
The standard strategy to assess the quantitative performance of monetary business cycle
models is to investigate impulse responses to (monetary policy) shocks. Whereas New
Keynesian models perform very well in these experiments (Woodford (2003), Christiano
et al. (2005)), I show that there is an inconsistency between one of the model’s main
predictions and observed monetary policy. Suppose the central bank wants to implement a
lower inflation target. The most prominent example of such a regime change is presumably
the 1970s, a period of high inflation, followed by the Volcker disinflation.1 Once a lower
inflation regime is considered to be optimal, central bankers’ conventional wisdom suggests
that nominal interest rates should be increased.2 But this is not what standard New
Keynesian models predict. In these models the optimal policy response is to implement a
lower nominal interest rate right away.3
The reason for this inconsistency is clear if prices are flexible. In the absence of pricing
frictions, it is optimal to immediately adjust inflation to its new target level. The Fisher
equation – the nominal interest rate equals the real interest rate plus the inflation rate –
then implies that the nominal interest should be lowered immediately. This mechanism is
related to what is typically referred to as the ‘expectations channel’. The central bank sets
1Primiceri (2005) and Sargent et al. (2005) support the view that this was indeed a target change. They
both explain the high inflation and the subsequent disinflation as the optimal policy outcome of a rational
policy maker who has to learn the “true” data generating mechanism. In both papers the government’s
perception was that disinflation was too costly during the 1970s. The perceived inflation-unemployment
trade-off became favorable, relative to the level of inflation, only in the late 1970s, which then led to a
disinflation. Ireland (2005) and Milani (2006) estimate the Fed’s inflation target and find a sharp drop in
its level in the late 1970s.
2This conventional wisdom is very well conveyed in the excellent historical review of the Volcker dis-
inflation by Lindsey et al. (2005). Erceg and Levin (2003) provide further references and state that the
federal funds rate remained the main instrument of monetary policy, although the Federal Reserve’s stated
operational target involved the stock of nonborrowed reserves from 1979:4 to 1982:3.
3Alvarez et al. (2001) also suggest that standard monetary models contradict observed monetary policy.
They, however, leave the question unanswered whether a model with nominal rigidities can overcome this
conclusion.
nominal interest rates, which are consistent with the private sector’s expectations of lower
inflation rates in the future.
With sticky prices this expectations channel is also available but there is an additional
‘aggregate demand’ channel, which links lower aggregate demand to lower inflation rates.
According to this channel, nominal interest rates are increased to raise real interest rates,
which leads to lower aggregate demand and to lower inflation rates. Using this channel is
however quite costly, since it requires an output contraction, which can be avoided when
the expectations channel is used. Even with sticky prices it is then optimal to only use
the expectations channel with the consequence that nominal interest rates are uniformly
lowered to implement a lower inflation target. An immediate adjustment of inflation to its
target level however is not necessarily optimal in the presence of pricing frictions. Instead,
inflation and nominal interest rates are only gradually adjusted.
The qualitative properties of optimal policy do not change if several features that are
part of recent vintages of New Keynesian models, such as habit formation in consumption,
sticky wages and wage and price indexation, are allowed for. Nominal interest rates are
uniformly lowered to implement a lower inflation target.
This result may appear counterintuitive since model-generated impulse response func-
tions fit the data well. In particular, the inflation rate drops in response to a short-lived
increase in nominal interest rates. The two experiments - implementing a lower inflation
target on the one hand and monetary policy shocks on the other hand - thus lead to dif-
ferent conclusions. How can this apparent contradiction be reconciled?
There are two reasons which explain the different conclusions. First, a short-lived in-
crease in nominal interest rates does not create expectations of a lower inflation rate in
the long run. As a result, the role of the expectations channel is diminished in the second
experiment. Second, a positive shock to the nominal interest rate leads to a contraction in
output and to lower inflation rates. Whereas it is optimal not to use this channel in the
first experiment, an output contraction is an avoidable consequence of a positive shock to
nominal interest rates in the second experiment.
Although the expectations channel is the key mechanism, the results of this paper do
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not depend on expectations being fully rational, the standard assumption in the New Key-
nesian literature. I show that the inconsistency between the model and monetary policy
remains, if inflation expectations are linked to current inflation. Even with non-rational
expectations, it is optimal to uniformly lower inflation rates, which leads to uniformly lower
inflation expectations and thus to uniformly lower nominal interest rates.
All results in this paper characterize optimal policy and do not hold if policy is not op-
timal. For example, Erceg and Levin (2003) find that nominal interest rates are increased
in response to a persistent drop in the inflation target. However, this finding depends on
their specification of the monetary policy rule, which does not describe the optimal policy.4
Another difference is that Erceg and Levin (2003) assume that the private sector has to
learn the central bank’s inflation target, whereas I assume perfect credibility.5 I discuss in
Appendix A why their specification of the interest rate rule, and not their assumption of
imperfect credibility, drives their findings.
Concerning the implications of a disinflation for output, most macroeconomists’ view
is that a disinflation is associated with a recession. In the basic New Keynesian model,
however, the opposite result holds: A disinflation causes an output boom (Ball (1994) and
Ball et al. (2005)). The reason is that a lower future inflation rate leads to preemptive
price cuts in the current period, which stimulate demand and lead to an immediate output
expansion. With sufficiently strong indexation of prices, as for example in Giannoni and
Woodford (2004), the incentives for preemptive price cuts disappear since prices are auto-
matically lowered when future inflation rates fall. Thus, a disinflation does not necessarily
lead to an immediate expansion. The New Keynesian model, amended with full price in-
dexation, is thus inconsistent with conventional wisdom about nominal interest rates but
consistent with conventional wisdom about output.
4Specifically, they use it = 1.43
pit+pit−1+pit−2+pit−3
4 − 0.64pi∗+ . . ., where i is the nominal interest rate, pi
is the inflation rate and pi∗ is the inflation target. A drop in pi∗ then mechanically leads to a non-optimal
increase in it.
5Ball (1995a) also considers a disinflation in a simple New Keynesian model with imperfect credibility
and Ireland (1995, 1997) computes the optimal disinflation path. The focus of these papers is on the welfare
and output effects of a disinflation and not on nominal interest rates.
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In the next section, I consider a simple, analytically tractable sticky price model that
aims at providing the intuition for the main results. Section 3 describes the model of Gi-
annoni and Woodford (2004), which features habit formation in consumption, sticky wages
and sticky prices, and indexation of prices and wages. The parameter estimates of Giannoni
and Woodford (2004) and the results for the optimal paths of nominal and real interest
rates and inflation are presented in Section 4. Section 5 provides a sensitivity analysis and
Section 6 concludes. All proofs are delegated to the appendix.
2 A Simple Model
I now present a basic New Keynesian model which includes, following Clarida et al.
(1999)(CGG), both cost-push shocks and shocks to the natural rate of interest. This model
allows for theoretical results since it abstracts from several features such as habit formation
in consumption, sticky wages and wage and price indexation. All of these elements will be
present in the general model below. The purpose of this simple model is to understand
which properties of the model are crucial for the results.
The economy is described by two equations. I follow Woodford (2003) and consider, for
tractability, a log-linearized version.6 The first equation, the Phillips curve, summarizes
the optimal price setting behavior of monopolistically competitive firms under a Calvo
(1983)-style price adjustment mechanism:
pit = κxt + βEtpit+1 + ut, (1)
where pit is the inflation rate, xt is the output gap - the difference between log output with
sticky prices and log output when prices are flexible - in period t and ut is, in the terminology
of CGG, a cost-push shock. The discount factor of the representative household is denoted
β ∈ (0, 1) and κ > 0 is the “slope” of the Phillips curve, which depends on features such
as the frequency of price changes and the sensitivity of prices to changes in marginal cost.
6Benigno and Woodford (2006) show that any optimal policy problem can be approximated through a
problem with (L)inear constraints and a (Q)uadratic objective function. See Benigno and Woodford (2006)
for a discussion of the advantages of the LQ approach.
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The second equation, the IS equation, is derived from the standard consumption Euler
equation of the representative household:
xt = Etxt+1 − σEt(it − pit+1 − rnt ), (2)
where it is the nominal interest rate in period t and r
n
t is the real interest rate in period t
if prices were flexible.7
The policy experiment is as follows. At time t = 0 the central bank is told to implement
an inflation target pˆi∗ that is lower than the current inflation target p¯i∗. The goal is then
to compute the sequence of nominal interest rates that implement the regime change.
An optimal policy is a sequence pit and xt which minimizes the loss function
∞∑
t=0
βt[(pit − pi∗)2 + λx(xt − x∗)2], (3)
subject to constraints (1) and (2).
Here pi∗ is the inflation target and equals pi∗ without a regime change and equals pˆi∗ < pi∗
with a regime change. All results in this section hold for all values of pˆi∗ < pi∗, but for
the linearization to be appropriate, one should think of inflation targets sufficiently close
to zero.8
The output target is denoted x∗ and λx is the weight that is assigned to output stabi-
lization. Two cases are considered for how the choice of x∗ is related to the inflation target
pi∗. Either the output target x∗ is the same for both inflation targets or it is chosen to be
consistent with the inflation target and the Phillips curve (1), that is x∗ = (1− β)pi∗/κ.
I now characterize it(pi
∗) and it(pˆi∗), the paths for nominal interest rates under the two
different regimes. The same notation is used for pi and x to denote the dependence on the
inflation target (pit(pi
∗), pit(pˆi∗), xt(pi∗) and xt(pˆi∗)).
7All variables, except for inflation, are log deviations from their trend values.
8To be fully consistent with interpreting the model as a linearization, one can resort to a ‘trick’ which
is useful in a quantitative analysis (see for example Erceg and Levin (2003)). The new low inflation target
pˆi∗ = 0 and the high inflation target pi∗ = 0.999t, where t denotes time. In both regimes, the unique steady
state equals 0 (since 0.999t converges to zero) and the linearization is thus appropriate. However, for the
first couple of years after the regime change, the high inflation regime behaves as if pi∗ = 1.
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In two special cases - if prices are assumed to be flexible or the weight assigned to output
stabilization λx is zero - the characterization of optimal policy is simple. The inflation rate
is always set equal to its target level since either the output gap is zero (if prices are flexible)
or not a concern (if λx = 0). The nominal interest rate then equals r
n
t +pi
∗ without a target
change and rnt + pˆi
∗ with the new target. Thus the central bank immediately reduces the
nominal interest rate by pi∗ − pˆi∗ > 0 to implement the lower inflation rate.
Proposition 1 (Two special cases) If either prices are flexible or λx = 0, the nominal
interest rate is uniformly lower in the new regime: it(pˆi
∗)− it(pi∗) = pˆi∗ − pi∗ < 0.
An immediate adjustment of inflation, nominal interest rates and output to their new
target levels is also optimal in a model with sticky prices and λx > 0 if there are no
cost-push shocks (ut ≡ 0) and the output target is consistent with the inflation target
(x∗ = (1− β)pi∗/κ). If one of these two assumptions is relaxed - there are cost-push shocks
or x∗ 6= (1 − β)pi∗/κ - an inflation-output trade-off exists. The optimal adjustment of
inflation to its new target level is then only gradual.
But whether the adjustment of inflation is immediate or not, the implications for the
path of nominal interest rates always has one property: if the new inflation target is lower
(pˆi∗ < p¯i∗), then the nominal interest rate is uniformly lower it(pˆi∗)− it(pi∗) < 0 for all t.
The reason is that it is optimal to uniformly and immediately lower the inflation rate
when the inflation target is decreased. The Fisher equation - the nominal interest rate i
equals inflation pi plus the real interest rate r - then implies that nominal interest rates track
the inflation rate. As a consequence, nominal interest rates are lowered uniformly and right
away. This optimal policy avoids the costly aggregate demand channel, which prescribes
that real interest rates should be increased to contract output and thus lower inflation.
Indeed, the real interest rate is (slightly) lower for a lower inflation target (rt(pˆi
∗)−rt(pi∗) ≤ 0
for all t). By the Fisher equation (i = r+pi) a lower r leads to lower nominal interest rates
by itself. However, it turns out in the quantitative exploration of the general model in the
subsequent sections that the real interest rate only moves within narrow bands around its
steady-state level. The quantitatively important reason for lower nominal interest rates is
thus lower inflation rates and not lower real interest rates.
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The result, i.e. that nominal interest rates are lowered, holds for any size of pricing
frictions, parameterized through κ. But the optimal policy changes if the extent of price
stickiness changes. For example, a smaller κ (prices are more sticky) decreases |pit(pˆi∗) −
pit(pi
∗)|, i.e. that it is optimal to slow down the speed of convergence to the new inflation
target. The same arguments apply to an increase in λx, the weight of output in the loss
function. A higher λx slows down adjustment, i.e. it lowers |pit(pˆi∗) − pit(pi∗)|. This result
is consistent with proposition 1, which considers the extreme case λx = 0: If the weight
on output is zero, immediate adjustment is optimal. Another interpretation of this result
is that both a weak (a high λx) and a tough (a low λx) central banker decrease nominal
interest rates and only the speed of the disinflation process differs.9
To get an analytical characterization of optimal policy, I assume that the zero bound on
nominal interest rates is not binding. I can then derive all results for arbitrary sequences of
shocks with a simple outcome. Additivity of shocks and the linear-quadratic nature of the
problem imply that the differences pit(pˆi
∗)− pit(pi∗), xt(pˆi∗)− xt(pi∗) and it(pˆi∗)− it(pi∗) are
unaffected by shocks. But the assumption that the zero bound on nominal interest rates is
not binding is needed, since the optimal sequences pit, xt and it are affected by shocks.
Proposition 2 (No cost-push shocks) Assume that the zero bound on nominal interest
rates is never binding.
Without cost-push shocks (ut ≡ 0), the nominal interest rate is uniformly lower in the new
regime: it(pˆi
∗)− it(pi∗) < 0 for all t ≥ 0.
If in addition x∗ = (1 − β)pi∗, both the inflation rate and the nominal interest rate are
adjusted immediately to their new target levels, pit = pˆi
∗ and it(pˆi∗) − it(pi∗) = pˆi∗ − pi∗ < 0
for all t ≥ 0.
Proposition 3 (Cost-push shocks) Assume that the zero bound on nominal interest
rates is never binding. With cost-push shocks the nominal interest is uniformly lower in
the new regime: it(pi
∗)− it(pˆi∗) < 0 for all t ≥ 0.
9See for example Backus and Driffill (1985), Barro (1986) and Ball (1995b) for models where policy
makers can be either weak or tough.
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I have so far made the standard assumption in the literature that expectations are fully
rational. McCallum (2005) however argues that inflation expectations adjust only slowly to
a regime change. If this view of the economy is also what central bankers have in mind, then
central bankers’ conventional wisdom could rely on some form of adaptive expectations.
The next section shows that this is not the case. If inflation expectations are linked to
current inflation, optimal policy in the New Keynesian model is still not consistent with
conventional wisdom.
2.1 Adaptive Expectations
The model is the same as in the previous section except for one difference. Expected
inflation Etpit+1 is linked to current inflation here:
Etpit+1 = (1− γ)pit+1 + γpit, (4)
for some γ ∈ [0, 1], whereas expectations are fully rational in the previous section, Etpit+1 =
pit+1. The formulation in this section includes both the case of purely adaptive expectations
if γ = 1 and the case of rational expectations if γ = 0. However, an intermediate value
of γ ∈ (0, 1) presumably describes the data best, since agents, as Erceg and Levin (2003)
document for the Volcker disinflation, adapted their inflation expectations to the shift in
monetary policy and did not base their expectations on current inflation rates only.10
Two equations then describe an equilibrium:
pit = κxt + β((1− γ)pit+1 + γpit) (5)
xt = xt+1 − σ(it − ((1− γ)pit+1 + γpit)− rn). (6)
Note that I set all shocks equal to zero (the same arguments as in the previous section
would establish that results would be unchanged if shocks were added).
Again, the policy experiment is to implement an inflation target pˆi∗ that is lower than
10In numerical examples (analytical results are not available), I also allowed for a learning component
ρ(pit − pit−1) so that Etpit+1 = (1 − γ)pit+1 + γ(pit + ρ(pit − pit−1)). The conclusions of the paper remain
unchanged.
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the current inflation target p¯i∗. An optimal policy is then a sequence pit and xt which
minimizes the loss function
∞∑
t=0
βt[(pit − pi∗)2 + λx(xt − x∗)2], (7)
subject to the two constraints (5) and (6).
The next proposition states that allowing for adaptive expectations does not change the
main conclusions of this section. Nominal interest rates are lowered to implement a lower
inflation target.
Proposition 4 Assume that the zero bound on nominal interest rates is never binding.
Then nominal interest rates are uniformly lower in the new regime: it(pˆi
∗)− it(pi∗) < 0 for
all t ≥ 0.
The reason for this result is the same as in the case with rational expectations. It is always
optimal to uniformly lower inflation in response to a drop in the inflation target. The
Fisher equation then implies that nominal interest rates have to be uniformly lowered as
well.
This reasoning invalidates the intuition that nominal interest rates should be increased
to signal that the central bank is tough on inflation. Instead, a central bank which wants to
be tough on inflation - bring down inflation fast and put a small weight on output - should
decrease nominal interest rates fast. An increase in nominal interest rates on the other
hand would only signal higher future inflation rates. Proposition 4 also demonstrates that
this result holds if the role of the expectations channel is diminished (γ is small). Even for
a small γ, it is not optimal to use the aggregate demand channel but instead to rely on the
expectations channel to lower inflation.
Another assumption that I make throughout the paper is that of full commitment
to future policies. Although this is the standard assumption in New Keynesian models, a
body of literature, initiated by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983),
assumes that the government does not have the ability to commit to future choices, but
can re-optimize every period. In the next subsection, I show that adopting this assumption
does not change the conclusions of this paper.
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2.2 Discretionary Monetary Policy
When the policymaker re-optimizes every period in the basic New Keynesian model de-
scribed above, the first-order condition in period t is:
(pit − pi∗) + λx
κ
(
pit − βpit+1
κ
− x∗), (8)
where I already incorporated that inflation expectations are rational. Since the choice
problem is the same in every period, the optimal level of inflation is the same for all t. The
discretionary inflation piDMP then equals
piDMP =
pi∗ + x∗ λx
κ
1 + (1− β)λx
κ2
. (9)
The result that the inflation rate is constant implies that both the output level and the
nominal interest rate are constant as well, and leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 5 The nominal interest rate is immediately adjusted to its new level and is
uniformly lower in the new regime: it(pˆi
∗)− it(pi∗) = pˆi∗−pi∗1+(1−β)λx
κ2
< 0.
For optimal policy in a New Keynesian model to be consistent with conventional wisdom,
it is necessary that one of the two following conditions hold: It is optimal to increase
inflation or inflation expectations have to increase if the inflation target is lowered. The
model with rational expectations, the model with adaptive expectations, and the model
with time-consistent policy all do not satisfy these conditions.
3 The General Model
Giannoni and Woodford (2004)(GW) extend the Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) sticky
price model to allow for sticky wages, indexation of wages and prices to the lagged price
index, and habit persistence in private consumption expenditures. I use their linearized
model except for one feature. GW assume that expenditure decisions are predetermined
two quarters in advance and prices and wages are predetermined one quarter in advance.
To simplify notation I omit this complication and assume that there are no decision lags.
Section 5 shows that this assumption is inessential for the results.
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3.1 Optimal Consumption Decisions
Optimal consumption decisions imply that the intertemporal consumption Euler equation
holds. With habit persistence (that is, current utility depends on xt − ηxt−1 and not on
the output gap xt only
11), the linearized version of the Euler equation is a generalization
of the IS-equation (2) and has the form
x˜t = Etx˜t+1 − ϕ−1Et(it − pit+1 − rnt ), (10)
where x˜t = (xt − ηxt−1) − βηEt(xt+1 − ηxt), it is the nominal interest rate at t, pit is the
inflation rate at t and rnt is the real interest rate that would prevail if prices and wages
are flexible. In a steady-state rnt = 1/β − 1.12 The coefficient 0 ≤ η ≤ 1 is the degree of
habit persistence and ϕ−1 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, adjusted for habit
persistence.
Without habit persistence (η = 0) equation (10) reduces to the standard Euler/IS equation
(2). With habit persistence (η > 0), an increase in the output gap xt decreases marginal
utility in period t (which also depends on xt−1) and decreases marginal utility in period
t+1 (which also depends on xt+1). This is why x˜t and not only xt is the relevant variable
for the Euler equation.
3.2 Optimal Wage and Price Setting
A discrete version of the optimizing model of staggered price setting following Calvo (1983),
modified to allow for indexation of the price index during periods of no re-optimization,
leads to the following log-linearized aggregate-supply relation:
pit − γppit−1 = ξpωpxt + ξp(wt − wnt ) + βEt(pit+1 − γppit), (11)
where 0 ≤ γp ≤ 1 is the degree of automatic indexation to the (lagged) aggregate price
index. The parameters ξp and ξw measure the degree to which prices and wages are sticky
11GW assume that current utility depends on the household’s own past consumption level, and not on
that of other households, this means they have an internal rather than an external habit.
12Note that I do not subtract the steady-state values from i and r. All other variables, except for
inflation, are still log-deviations from their steady-state value.
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respectively. Specifically, ξp indicates the responsiveness of price inflation to the gap be-
tween marginal cost and current prices and ξw indicates the responsiveness of wage inflation
to the gap between households’ marginal rate of substitution (the wage on agents’ supply
curve) and current wages. The coefficient ωp is the quantity-elasticity of marginal cost and
ωw is the quantity-elasticity of households’ marginal rate of substitution.
13 The real wage is
denoted wt and w
n
t is the “natural real wage”, the equilibrium real wage when both wages
and prices are flexible. Sticky wages thus induce real disturbances wt − wnt , which have
similar consequences to the cost-push shocks in section 2.
To model sticky wages, GW follow Erceg et al. (2000) and assume staggered wage setting
analogous to the staggered price setting in Calvo (1983). This gives the second equation
of the supply side:
piwt − γwpit−1 = ξw(ωwxt + ϕx˜t) + ξw(wnt − wt) + βEt(piwt+1 − γwpit), (12)
where piw is nominal wage inflation that satisfies the identity
wt = wt−1 + piwt − pit. (13)
Equation (12) can equivalently be rewritten as
piwt − γwpit−1 = κw[(xt − δxt−1)− βδEt(xt+1 − δxt)] + ξw(wnt − wt) + βEt(piwt+1 − γwpit),
(14)
where 0 ≤ δ ≤ η is the smaller root of ηϕ(1 + βδ2) = [ωw +ϕ(1 + βη2)]δ and κw = ξwηϕ/δ.
3.3 Loss function and constraints
To compute the optimal deflation policy, I have to specify a loss function and I simplify
the constraints (10), (11), (13) and (14), which together characterize an equilibrium for a
given policy.
To isolate the effects of a lower inflation target, I abstract from any real shocks.14 I set
13For more details on these coefficients, in particular how they are related to features such as the frequency
of price and wage adjustment, see GW and Woodford (2003).
14I showed in section 2 that shocks do not affect it(pˆi∗)− it(pi∗), the difference between nominal interest
rates with and without a change in the inflation target.
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wnt and r
n
t to their steady-state values, w
n
t = 0 and r
n
t = 1/β − 1.
Next, I solve equation (13) for piwt = wt − wt−1 + pit and substitute it into the wage
setting equation (14). Perfect-foresight equilibrium paths for inflation, output, wages and
nominal interest rates are therefore characterized through two aggregate supply equations
pit − γppit−1 = ξpωpxt + ξpwt + β(pit+1 − γppit), (15)
wt − wt−1 + pit − γwpit−1 = κw[(xt − δxt−1)− βδ(xt+1 − δxt)]− ξwwt + β(wt+1 − wt + pit+1 − γwpit),
(16)
and through the Euler/IS equation
it − pit+1 − (1/β − 1) = ϕ(x˜t+1 − x˜t), (17)
The objective of monetary policy is assumed to minimize deviations of price inflation,
output, wage inflation and nominal interest rates from its target values. The discounted
loss function then equals
∞∑
t=0
βt[(pit − pi∗)2 + λx(xt − x∗)2 + λw(pit + wt − wt−1 − pi∗w)2 + λi(it)2], (18)
where pi∗, x∗ and pi∗w are the target values for price inflation, output and wage inflation
respectively and where I used the identity piwt = wt − wt−1 + pit. Note that the objective
function (18) depends on the levels of pi and x, whereas in Woodford (2003) quasi-differences
xt − ηxt−1, pit − γppit−1, piwt − γwpit−1 enter the objective function. While I abstract from
this complication here, I will discuss in section 5 that this simplification is inessential for
the results. Following Woodford (2003), I also allow for monetary frictions here (reflected
by the term λi(it)
2 in the loss function), but I will also consider λi = 0 in the sensitivity
analysis.15
15The fact that λi > 0 allows Woodford (2003) to derive an optimal interest rate rule, which is equivalent
to a first-order condition, is his optimization problem. He finds that lower(higher) inflation rates require
lower(higher) nominal interest rates. This finding is consistent with the results of my paper, once it is
recognized that it is optimal to lower inflation rates during a disinflation. On top of the positive co-
movement of inflation and nominal interest rates, a drop in the inflation target leads to a drop in the
intercept of the interest rate rule. Another interpretation of a positive λi is that central banks apparently
care about reducing the volatility of nominal interest rates (Goodfriend (1991)).
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4 Optimal Disinflation
The policy experiment is the same as in section 2. At date t = 0 the inflation target
pi∗ is lowered from p¯i∗ to pˆi∗. The monetary authority chooses sequences for the inflation
rate {pit}∞t=0, the output gap {xt}∞t=0, wages {wt}∞t=0 and nominal interest rates {it}∞t=0 to
minimize the loss function (18) such that the constraints for optimal price setting (15),
optimal wage setting (16) and optimal consumption decisions (17) are fulfilled.
The main difference between the models in sections 2 and 3 is that past values, for
example lagged inflation rates, affect current allocations in the general model but not in
the simple model. This makes it necessary to specify initial conditions for these variables.
I assume that the economy is in a steady-state with pi = p¯i∗ before the policy change. The
steady-state values of the three other endogenous variables - output, wages and nominal
interest rates - have to fulfill the steady-state versions of equations (15), (16) and (17).
This choice seems reasonable since the paper wants to capture a regime change, where a
low inflation rate is the new target after a period of high inflation.
In the appendix, I compute the first-order conditions and show that they, together with
the three constraints (15), (16) and (17), can equivalently be expressed as a difference
equation of the form
zt+1 = Azt, (19)
where zt = (pit−1, pit, xt−2, xt−1, xt, wt−1, wt, µt−1, µt, χt−1, χt, it−1, it) and some matrix A.
The next step makes it necessary to compute the eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the matrix
A, which is possible only once numerical values for all parameters are specified. The details
are again laid out in the appendix. I now describe how I choose the parameters.
4.1 Parameter Values
The parameters are exactly those found in the quarterly model of Giannoni and Wood-
ford (2004). They follow Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and choose the parameters to
minimize the distance between the theoretical model impulse response function and the
estimated VAR impulse response functions. Table 1 shows their results. Two parameters
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Table 1: Estimated Parameter Values from Giannoni and Woodford (2004).
η γp γw ξp ξw ϕ ωw
1 1 1 0.002 0.0042 0.7483 19.551
are calibrated directly in GW. β is set equal to 0.99 to match an steady-state real interest
rate of one percent. They set ωp = 1/3 to match the output elasticity with respect to
hours. Two parameters, κw and δ, are functions of other parameters as described in the
last section. The values are shown in table 2.
What remains to be determined are the welfare weights for output, wages and nominal
interest rates (the welfare weight for inflation is normalized to 1). There are two natural
possibilities. The first one is to choose the welfare weights such that the loss function is a
second-order approximation to the utility function of the representative agent. The second
possibility is to pick the welfare weights to reflect conventional wisdom about the central
bank’s objective - stabilization of inflation and output. Since I want to compare the opti-
mal policy in the theoretical model to conventional wisdom about policy, I follow the latter
possibility and consider the first possibility - utility-based welfare weights - in Section 5.
I thus assume high weights for both inflation and output stabilization and I set λx = 1.
For λw, GW find that wage inflation stabilization is of minor importance for the central
bank. I thus choose λw = 0.004 as in GW. Finally, Woodford (2003) finds λi = 0.077, but
he considers this to be an upper bound. Since a higher value for λi implies that lowering
nominal interest rates becomes more important, I choose λi = 0.02, the lower bound in
Woodford (2003). In addition, to isolate the effect of the change in the inflation target,
I report results for the difference in nominal interest rates it(pˆi
∗) − it(pi∗) as in section 2
(there I considered the difference to isolate the effect of target changes from the effects of
shocks.).
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Table 2: Additional Parameter Values.
β λx λw λi ωp κw δ
0.99 1 0.004 0.02 1/3 0.0883 0.0356
4.2 Results
Now that I have specified the model and its parameters, I can compute the optimal policy
response to a change in the inflation target for this model. The details of the procedure
are described in the appendix. Figure 1 shows the optimal sequence of nominal interest
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Figure 1: Optimal nominal interest rates to implement a drop in the inflation target. The dashed
line is the steady-state nominal interest rate without a target change. Parameter values are given
in tables 1 and 2.
rates it to implement the inflation target pˆi
∗ = 0. The dashed line at pi∗ + 1/β − 1 =
0.01 + 1/β − 1 = 0.02 is the nominal interest rate in the steady-state before the target
change (when the inflation target pi∗ = 0.01). The nominal interest rate after the target
change takes values lower than pi∗ + 1/β − 1 = 0.02 in all periods t ≥ 0. This says that
nominal interest rates should be uniformly lowered to implement a lower inflation target.
As discussed above, to isolate the effect of the change in the inflation target (for example
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from the need to reduce monetary frictions), figure 2 shows the difference it(pˆi
∗) − it(pi∗)
between nominal interest rates with and without a target change. Again the nominal
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0
1 6 11 16 21 26 31 36 41 46
Figure 2: Difference it(pˆi∗)− it(pi∗) in optimal nominal interest rates for inflation targets pˆi∗ and
pi∗, where pˆi∗ < pi∗. Parameter values are given in tables 1 and 2.
interest rates are uniformly lower if the inflation target is smaller. This conclusion does
not change for very high welfare weights of output, such as λx = 10, or for very low values
of λx = 0.002.
The central bank can use two channels to lower the inflation rate, the aggregate de-
mand channel and the expectations channel. Since the aggregate demand channel involves
higher real interest rates and thus unnecessary output contractions, it is optimal to use the
expectations channel only. The Fisher equation then implies that the nominal interest rate
tracks the inflation rate. If the inflation target is decreased, it is optimal to uniformly lower
the inflation rate (Figure 3 shows the optimal inflation path) and therefore to uniformly
lower nominal interest rates.
Although the aggregate demand channel is not used, the Phillips curve implies that
output cannot be fully stabilized. The fluctuations in output are however quite small, as
Figure 4 shows. Output never falls below −0.3% and is never higher than 0.1% (relative
to its steady-state level). Consistent with conventional wisdom, output after a drop in the
inflation target is lower than output without such a drop, at least for the first 8 years (= 32
17
quarters).
At the same time, the real interest rate hardly moves. Figure 5 shows that the real
interest rate stays within a 0.1 percentage point band around its steady-state value 1
β
− 1,
and has almost converged to it after a year. A comparison of the real interest rate with and
without a drop in the inflation target strengthens this observation. The difference of the
real interest rate between these two regimes is about 0.001%, i.e. virtually zero. In other
words, variations in real interest rates are kept to a minimum and the aggregate demand
channel is inactive.
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Figure 3: The solid line is the optimal inflation rate path after a drop in the inflation target.
The dashed line is the inflation rate pi∗ before the target change. Parameter values are given in
tables 1 and 2.
The quantitative results in this section show that the theoretical conclusions drawn from
the restricted model in section 2 do not change once features such as habit persistence,
indexation and sticky wages are added. Nominal interest rates are uniformly lowered to
implement a lower inflation target and real interest rates are virtually unchanged.
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Figure 4: The solid line is the optimal output after a drop in the inflation target. The dashed
line is the optimal output path without a target change.
5 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, I investigate the robustness of the results for different parameter values, for
different welfare criteria and if decision lags in consumption, prices and wages are allowed
for.
For each robustness check, I only show the results for the path of nominal interest
rates but the conclusions drawn from these experiments remain unchanged if I consider the
difference it(pˆi
∗)− it(pi∗) (as in figure 2).
5.1 Parameter Values
GW choose the parameters to minimize the distance between the model and empirical
impulse response functions. Two robustness checks seem necessary. First, the parameters
ξp, ξw, ϕ and ωw are imprecisely estimated. Second, to estimate parameters from impulse
response functions, it is necessary to specify the length of the horizon following the shock.
The results in table 1 are based on a horizon of 12 quarters, but this choice is somewhat
arbitrary. I now compute how different parameter values and how different time horizons
change the results.
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Figure 5: The solid line is the optimal path of the real interest rate after a drop in the inflation
target. The dashed line is the steady-state real interest rate 1β − 1.
Estimated Parameters for Alternative Horizons
GW provide estimates for different horizons namely 6, 8, 12, 16 and 20 quarters. Table 3 in
the appendix shows their estimated values and figure 10 shows the results for all 5 possible
horizons including the benchmark, 12 quarters. It is quite evident that the choice of the
horizon has a negligible impact on the results.
Different Parameter Values
Whereas the upper bound of 1 is binding for the parameters η (degree of habit persistence),
γp (degree of price indexation) and γw (degree of wage indexation), the other parameters, ξp,
ξw, ϕ and ωw, are imprecisely estimated. I therefore vary these four parameters to check the
robustness of the results. Note that η, γp and γw are not only precisely estimated but that,
as already demonstrated in section 2, eliminating persistence (setting η = γp = γw = 0)
would not change the conclusions.
Figures 11 to 14 show the results, separately for each parameter, when ξp takes values
0.001, 0.002 and 0.1, ξw takes values 0.001, 0.0042 and 0.1, ϕ takes values 0.1, 0.7483 and 10
and ωw takes values 5, 19.551 and 35. Note that the second number is the benchmark value
(table 1). In all cases the conclusions do not change although the parameter variations are
quite big and would lead to a deterioration of the model’s empirical performance, when
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assessed by comparing impulse responses in the model and in the data. If for example
ϕ = 10, changes in nominal interest rates would have very small output effects in contrast
to the hump-shaped response in the data. The high value for ϕ also affects the path
of nominal interest rates, which are immediately sharply decreased. The small effect of
nominal interest rates on output implies that output is not a concern for monetary policy
and monetary frictions become more important (λi = 0.02). This leads to a drop in nominal
interest rates in figure 13 if ϕ = 10, similar to the results in figure 1.
5.2 Predetermined Decisions
There is a small difference between the model used in section 4 and the model estimated
in GW. GW assume that consumption decisions are predetermined two periods in advance
and prices and wages are set one period in advance, whereas there are no decision lags in
consumption, prices or wages in section 4. In this section I check whether different assump-
tions about the predeterminedness of agents’ decisions change the results. Specifically, I
compute the optimal policy when
a) consumption is predetermined two periods in advance and prices and wages are pre-
determined one period in advance (as in GW)
b) consumption, prices and wages are predetermined one period in advance
c) consumption is predetermined one period in advance and prices and wages are pre-
determined two periods in advance
and compare it to the benchmark in section 4. Figure 15 shows that the conclusion is robust
for all four assumptions about predeterminedness: Nominal interest rates are uniformly
lowered. Note that the figures show nominal interest rates only for periods where households
make a consumption/saving decision (for example in case a), the interest rates in the first
two periods are not determined).
If all variables are predetermined one period in advance (case b)), then the path for
optimal nominal interest is shifted one period to the right. This is a general property of
decision lags. More periods of predeterminedness just shift the paths of all variables to
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the right. This is why decision lags improve the impulse response of the model, since some
variables in the data respond with a lag only. For the experiment in this paper - lowering
the inflation target - the length of the decision lags does not affect the conclusions.
5.3 Different Loss Criteria
The loss/welfare function used in section 4 is based on two assumptions. First, only levels
(e.g. pit) and not quasi-differences (pit− γppit−1) matter. Second, the welfare weights λx, λw
and λi used in section 2 may still not coincide with a ‘classic’ central bank’s objective
function. I address these possible concerns in this section.
Different Loss Function
If minimizing the loss function is equivalent to maximizing the utility of a representative
household (or a quadratic approximation thereof as in GW), then quasi-differences and not
levels enter the objective function. Specifically, the objective is to minimize the deviations
of pit−γppit−1, piwt −γppit−1 and xt− δxt−1 from their target levels instead of minimizing the
deviations of pit, pi
w
t and xt from their target levels. I show now that this is inessential for
the results. For output x this is not very surprising since δ is quite small (equal to 0.0356).
For price and wage inflation, the coefficients are at their maximum level γp = γw = 1.
A high value of γp leads to two problems. First, if γp = 1, the steady-state level of
inflation is irrelevant for welfare since only changes in inflation, pit − pit−1, matter. The
experiment ‘lowering the inflation target’ would be meaningless. Second, since inflation
is of minor importance, monetary frictions dominate optimal policy, which can render
the zero bound on nominal interest rates binding in some periods. I therefore assume
that γp = 0.9. Figure 16 shows both the results when xt − δxt−1 matters, and when
pit − γppit−1 and piwt − γppit−1 matter and compares them to the benchmark. As expected,
the path of nominal interest rates does not change much if habit persistence enters the
welfare function. In contrast adding indexation to the welfare function changes the path
substantially. As explained above, indexation reduces the importance of reducing inflation
relative to reducing monetary frictions. The long-run optimal nominal interest rate then
equals 0.356% and the optimal path of nominal interest rates is shifted downwards. The
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size of this shift would be smaller for higher values of λx or lower values of λi but would
not change the conclusion. Nominal interest rates are always uniformly lowered.
I next compute the optimal policy for the full GW specification of the loss function.
Quasi-differences of price inflation, wage inflation and output enter the objective function
with the weights as in table 2, except for 16λx = 0.0026 and λi. Monetary frictions are no
concern here, which is equivalent to λi = 0. I set γp = 0.99 < 1 to make the experiment
‘lowering the inflation target’ meaningful. Figure 18 shows the result for two different
assumptions about predeterminedness. First, as in GW, when consumption is determined
two periods in advance and prices and wages are determined one period in advance and
second when there is no predeterminedness. Note that in the first case interest rates are
shown from period 2 on only, since they are not determined before. Since γp = 0.99 the
adjustment of inflation to its new target is very slow and so is the adjustment of nominal
interest rates. But the conclusion remains unchanged.
Different Welfare Weights
GW choose the welfare weights such that minimizing the loss function is equivalent to
maximizing a quadratic approximation of the expected utility of a representative household.
The resulting loss function differs from the ‘classic’ objective function of a central bank,
which stabilizes output and inflation only (see for example Clarida et al. (1999)). I therefore
consider a ‘classic’ loss function (pit−pi∗)2+(xt−x∗)2. Figure 17 shows the result. Again the
Fisher effect dominates optimal policy and nominal interest rates are lowered to implement
a lower target.
6 Conclusion
The results in this paper imply that there is an inconsistency between central bankers’
conventional wisdom and one implication of New Keynesian models. Conventional wisdom
suggests that nominal interest rates should be increased to implement a lower inflation
target. In contrast, the optimal policy in a New Keynesian model is to uniformly lower
nominal interest rates. This result holds both in a basic New Keynesian model with sticky
prices and in extensions of this model, such as Giannoni and Woodford (2004), which allow
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for sticky wages, price and wage indexation and habit formation in consumption.
The reason is that the aggregate demand channel, which raises real interest rates to con-
tract aggregate demand which then leads to lower inflation rates, is too costly relative to
the expectations channel. The expectations channel sets nominal interest rates consistent
with the private sector’s expectations of lower inflation rates in the future. Real interest
rates are basically constant and thus a costly output contraction is avoided.
Assuming adaptive instead of fully rational expectations does not change these conclu-
sions. Inflation again falls uniformly and so do inflation expectations (with a lag) and also
nominal interest rates. These experiments suggest that in models where the low inflation
target is not perfectly credible, as for example in Ball (1995a) and Erceg and Levin (2003)
(discussed in detail in Appendix A), nominal interest rates should still be decreased. The
reason is that, as in the model with adaptive expectations, both inflation and inflation
expectations come down uniformly. Indeed, in these kinds of models, imperfect credibility
leads to slower decreases of expected inflation and thus to slower decreases of nominal in-
terest rates, because of uncertainty about a potential reversal to a higher inflation regime.
Thus, whereas imperfect credibility changes the output implications of a disinflation, it
cannot change the conclusions of this paper.16
Recent work by Christiano et al. (2005) adds two more features to the model of Giannoni
and Woodford (2004): Capital formation (with adjustment costs and variable utilization
rates) and firms must borrow working capital to finance their wage bill.
Adding capital puts an additional constraint on the real interest rate - it has to equal
the marginal productivity of capital - and thus makes the aggregate demand channel less
effective. The expectations channel is not affected since real interest rates are basically kept
constant anyway when nominal interest rates track the inflation rate. These arguments are
16There is large literature that assumes that agents have imperfect knowledge of the economy. The
key result in this literature is that the persistence of inflation (expectations) is raised and that the trade-
off between inflation and output stabilization is distorted. This result for example helps to account for
inflation scars (Orphanides and Williams (2005b), leads to different conclusions about optimal monetary
policy (Orphanides and Williams (2004, 2005a, 2006), Gaspar et al. (2006)), and improves the fit of DSGE
models (Milani (2005)).
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consistent with the experiments in Christiano et al. (2005). For example, they find larger
increases of inflation in response to a decrease in nominal interest rates when they drop the
assumption of variable capital utilization (see row 1 of figure 6 in Christiano et al. (2005)).
The assumption that firms finance their wage bill through borrowing capital would fur-
ther strengthen my results. An increase in nominal interest rates increases firms’ marginal
costs and thus leads to price increases. Adding this feature to the model would make in-
creasing nominal interest rates an even worse choice to implement a lower inflation target.
Again Christiano et al. (2005) conduct experiments that support these arguments. When
they drop the assumption that firms have to borrow their wage bill, a decrease in nominal
interest rates leads to larger increases in inflation rates (see row 5 of figure 6 in Christiano
et al. (2005)).
The reasoning in this paper suggests that two deviations from the New Keynesian model
seem promising to reconcile the conventional wisdom with the predictions of an economic
model. First, changes in nominal interest rates should have strong effects on real inter-
est rates. A one percent increase in nominal interest rates would then not lead to a one
percent increase in inflation rates. Second, changes in nominal interest rates should, for
an unchanged real interest rate, have output effects. A decrease in nominal interest rates
would then necessarily lead to an output expansion and thus to some upward pressure on
prices.
New Keynesian models, as shown in this paper, are not a promising candidate to over-
come these problems due to the absence of a prominent role for liquidity (effects).17 Moti-
vated by these arguments, I develop a quantitative model in Hagedorn (2006), which indeed
has a strong liquidity effect. The new monetary transmission mechanism in this paper is
thus a candidate to reconcile central bankers’ conventional wisdom with economic theory.
17A related criticism of New Keynesian models is expressed in Alvarez et al. (2007). They argue that
New Keynesian models do not capture the exchange rate movements that we observe in the data. In both
papers, the explanation can be traced back to one key implication of the New Keynesian model: Changes
in nominal interest rates are divided into changes in the growth rate of marginal utility and in inflation.
However, whereas I argue that liquidity effects can break this linkage, Alvarez et al. (2007) suggest that
monetary policy changes the variances of marginal utilities and inflation.
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Appendix
A Imperfect Credibility: Erceg and Levin (2003)
Erceg and Levin (2003) consider a New Keynesian with capital accumulation and staggered
wage and price contracts of fixed duration (4 quarters). Monetary policy is not perfectly
credible since households cannot observe the central bank’s inflation target but need to dis-
entangle persistent and transitory shifts in the inflation target through observing monetary
policy. Monetary policy is described through the following interest rate reaction function:
it = γiit−1 + (1− γi)[r + pi(4)t +
γpi
γi
(pi
(4)
t − pi∗t ) + γy(ln(yt/yt−4)− gy)], (20)
where pi
(4)
t =
pit+pit−1+pit−2+pit−3
4
, i is the nominal interest rate, y is output, pi is the inflation
rate, pi∗ is the inflation target, r is the steady-state real interest rate, and gy is the steady-
state output growth rate.18 Erceg and Levin (2003) find that their New Keynesian model
with imperfect credibility accounts well for the dynamics of output, inflation and nominal
interest rates during the Volcker disinflation (modeled as a very persistent drop in the in-
flation target). In particular, inflation is persistent, there are substantial welfare costs, and
nominal interest rates are increased at the beginning of a disinflation. Figure 6 replicates
their results, which also shows the results with perfect credibility.19 Figure 6 suggests that
imperfect credibility can change the conclusion of this paper, namely that nominal interest
rates should be immediately decreased to implement a lower inflation target. However, this
would be a misinterpretation of Erceg and Levin (2003). They show that their model can
account for the dynamics of key variables whereas my paper considers the optimal policy
during a disinflation. I will now conduct three experiments to demonstrate this claim. The
main argument is that a drop in pi∗ mechanically leads to an increase in it, if pi(4) does not
18They use the following parameters: γi = 0.21, γpi = 0.64 and γy = 0.25.
19I am grateful to Chris Erceg and Andy Levin for providing me with their Matlab code. I used it to
reproduce their results and also to generate all the other results in this section.
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Figure 6: Replicates Figure 6 in Erceg and Levin (2003): Disinflation under Alternative Informational
Assumptions about the Inflation Target.
fall fast enough (because of learning). However, this mechanical increase is not optimal.
Instead, an optimal policy would, as suggested by the analysis in this paper, presumably
involve a drop in the intercept of the monetary policy, which is consistent with the new
inflation target.
First, I show that a slightly higher value for γpi = 0.87 leads to an increase in nominal
interest rates with full information about the central bank’s inflation target (Figure 7). As
I demonstrated in this paper, this is clearly not optimal. The explanation is that a higher
value for γpi leads to a larger mechanical increase in nominal interest rates, which is not
offset by the small drop in pi
(4)
t .
Next, I consider a different interest rate rule, which sets the nominal interest rate equal
to the inflation target. To ensure determinacy (otherwise I cannot solve the linear rational
expectations model) I add the term 1.01(pit−30 − pi∗t−30), which does not affect the results.
The monetary policy rule then equals
it = pi
∗
t + 1.01(pit−30 − pi∗t−30). (21)
Figure 8 shows the result of this thought experiment with full information and imperfect
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Figure 7: Disinflation under full information and interest rate rule (20) with γpi = 0.87.
credibility. The nominal interest rate immediately jumps to its new target level, inflation
slowly converges to its new target level and output drops. Thus, even with imperfect
credibility, the results shown in figure 8 are consistent with the main conclusion of this
paper: Nominal interest rates are uniformly lowered.
Finally, figure 9 shows that the monetary policy, described in equation (21), leads to
smaller welfare losses. Inflation adjusts faster to its new target level and output is always
closer to its target level.
This section shows that the findings of Erceg and Levin (2003) and the results of my
paper are consistent. Imperfect credibility leads to more inflation persistence and larger
output losses. If monetary policy is not optimal, the nominal interest rate can increase
before it eventually converges to its target level. However, this last result is driven by the
specification of the interest rate rule and not by an assumption on the observability of the
inflation target.
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Figure 8: Disinflation under Imperfect Observability of the Inflation Target and interest rate rule (equa-
tion 21).
B Proofs
Proof of Results in Section 2
An optimal perfect-foresight policy {pit, xt}t≥o minimizes
∞∑
t=0
βt[(pit − pi∗)2 + λx(xt − x∗)2], (22)
such that
pit = κxt + βpit+1 + ut. (23)
The IS-equation is not included since minimizing monetary frictions does not enter the
objective function in section 2. It just determines i once the optimal pi and x are known.
I solve the aggregate-supply relation for xt
xt = (pit − βpit+1 − ut)/κ (24)
and plug it into the objective function
min
pit,t≥0
∞∑
t=0
βt[(pit − pi∗)2 + λx((pit − βpit+1 − ut)/κ− x∗)2], (25)
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Figure 9: Output, Inflation and Nominal Interest Rates in a Disinflation under Imperfect Observability
for two Different Monetary Policy Rules: Immediate Adjustment (equation 21) and Erceg and Levin (2003)
(equation 20).
where pi∗ = pi∗ without a regime change and pi∗ = pˆi∗ with a regime change. The first order
necessary and sufficient conditions are:
pit − pi∗ + λx/κ(xt − xt−1) = 0 for t ≥ 1 (26)
(pi0 − pi∗) + λx/κ(x0 − x∗) = 0 for t = 0. (27)
The first order condition (26) yields a difference equation for pi:
pit+1 =
κ2
λxβ
(pit − pi∗) + 1 + β
β
pit − 1
β
pit−1 − 1
β
(ut − ut−1) for t ≥ 1. (28)
The characteristic polynomial, z2−z( κ2
λxβ
+ 1+β
β
)+ 1
β
has one root δ = b/2−
√
b2−4/β
2
∈ (0, 1),
where b = κ
2
βλx
+ 1+β
β
.
A solution to (28) is (plugging in verifies the claim)
cδt + δt
t∑
k=1
ηkδ
−k 1− (δ2β)−(t−k+1)
1− (δ2β)−1 + pi
∗ (29)
for some c, where ηt = − 1β (ut−1 − ut−2) for t ≥ 2, η1 = η0 = 0.
c is chosen to satisfy the initial condition, the first order condition with respect to pi0
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(equation (27)),
pi1 =
κ2
λxβ
(pi0 − pi∗) + 1
β
(pi0 − u0 − κx∗) (30)
This gives
c =
(β − 1)pi∗ + u0 + κx∗
1 + κ2/λx − βδ (31)
Without cost push shocks and x∗ = (1 − β)pi∗/κ, u0 = 0, c equals 0 and thus pit = pi∗ and
xt = x
∗ for all t. It follows that i∗t = r
n
t + pi
∗ and it(pˆi∗)− it(pi∗) = pˆi∗ − pi∗ < 0.
With cost-push shocks and x∗ = (1 − β)pi∗/κ, c equals u0
βδ−κ2/λx+1 . Since c is independent
from pi∗, pit(pˆi∗)−pit(pi∗) = pˆi∗−pi∗ and xt(pˆi∗)−xt(pi∗) = 0. It follows that it(pˆi∗)− it(pi∗) =
pˆi∗ − pi∗ < 0.
If x∗ is independent from pi∗, the difference in c equals
c(pˆi∗)− c(pi∗) = (1− β)(pˆi
∗ − pi∗)
βδ − κ2/λx − 1 > 0 (32)
Since 1− (1−β)
1+κ2/λx−βδ > 0,
pit(pˆi
∗)− pit(pi∗) = (pˆi∗ − pi∗)(1− δt (1− β)
1 + κ2/λx − βδ ) < 0 (33)
From equation (23) output equals
xt(pi
∗) =
pit(pi
∗)− βpit+1(pi∗)− ut
κ
(34)
and output growth equals
xt+1(pi
∗)− xt(pi∗) = pit+1(pi
∗)− βpit+2(pi∗)− pit(pi∗) + βpit+1(pi∗)− ut+1 + ut
κ
(35)
Plugging the solution for pit from (33) into (35) and simplifying yields:
(xt+1(pˆi
∗)− xt(pˆi∗))− (xt+1(pi∗)− xt(pi∗)) = pˆi
∗ − pi∗
κ
αδt(1− δ)(1− βδ) (36)
< 0,
where α = (1−β)
1+κ2/λx−βδ .
Plugging the solution for inflation and output growth into the IS-equation
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xt = xt+1 − σ(it − pit+1 − rnt ) yields:
it(pˆi
∗)− it(pi∗) = (xt+1(pˆi
∗)− xt(pˆi∗))− (xt+1(pi∗)− xt(pi∗))
σ
+ pit+1(pˆi
∗)− pit+1(pi∗)
< 0
Effects of changes in κ on | pit(pˆi∗)− pit(pi∗) |:
∂ | pit(pˆi∗)− pit(pi∗) |
∂κ
= (pˆi∗ − pi∗)δt−1α{∂δ
∂κ
− δ
1 + κ2/λx − βδ (2κ/λx − β
∂δ
∂κ
}
Since
∂δ
∂κ
=
κ
βλx
(1− b√
b2 − 4/β ) < 0
it follows that
∂ | pit(pˆi∗)− pit(pi∗) |
∂κ
> 0
The same computations show that
∂ | pit(pˆi∗)− pit(pi∗) |
∂λx
< 0
Proof of Results in Section 2.1
The same arguments used for rational expectations prove the results in the model with
adaptive expectations.
Solving the aggregate-supply relation (5) for xt and plugging it into the objective func-
tion gives
min
pit,t≥0
∞∑
t=0
βt[(pit − pi∗)2 + λx((pit − β((1− γ)pit+1 + γpit))/κ− x∗)2], (37)
where (6) again just determines i once the optimal pi and x are found.
For γ < 1 (γ = 1 will be treated below), the first order conditions yield a difference equation
for pi
pit+1 = −b˜pit − 1
β
pit−1 − k(pi∗) for t ≥ 1, (38)
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where b˜ = 1−βγ
β(1−γ) +
1−γ
β(1−βγ) +
κ2
λx(1−γ)(1−βγ) , k(pi
∗) = pi∗ κ
2
βλx(1−βγ)(1−γ) + x
∗ κγ(1−β)
β(1−γ)(1−βγ) and an
initial condition (the first-order condition for pi0):
(pi0 − pi∗) + λx(pi0 − β((1− γ)pi1 + γpi0)− x
∗)
κ
= 0. (39)
Computing the roots of the associated characteristic polynomial gives δ˜ = b˜/2−
√
b˜2−4/β
2
as
the only root in (0, 1). The long-run value of inflation piss is the solution to the steady-state
version of the first-order condition of pit:
piss =
pi∗κ2 − x∗λxβγ(1− β)
κ2 + (1− β)2λxγ (40)
The solution for pit then equals
c˜δ˜t + piss, (41)
where c˜ is chosen to satisfy the initial condition (39). This gives20
c˜(pi∗) =
piss(1− β)− κx∗
β(1− γ) + βγ−1
δ˜
. (42)
Since c˜(pˆi∗)− c˜(pi∗) > 0, piss(pˆi∗)− piss(pi∗) < 0 and 1− 1−β
β(1−γ)+βγ−1
δ˜
> 0 it follows that
pit(pˆi
∗)− pit(pi∗) = (piss(pˆi∗)− piss(pi∗)) + δ˜t(c˜(pˆi∗)− c˜(pi∗)) (43)
< (piss(pˆi∗)− piss(pi∗)) + (c˜(pˆi∗)− c˜(pi∗)) (44)
= (piss(pˆi∗)− piss(pi∗))(1− 1− β
β(1− γ) + βγ−1
δ˜
) (45)
< 0 (46)
I now use the solution for pi and (5) to derive an expression for output growth.
xt+1(pi
∗)− xt(pi∗) = c(pi
∗)
κ
{(1− βγ)δ˜t+1 − β(1− γ)δ˜t+2 − (1− βγ)δ˜t + β(1− γ)δ˜t+1}
=
c(pi∗)
κ
δ˜t(1− δ˜){βγ − 1 + δ˜β(1− γ)}
Thus the difference in output growth equals
(xt+1(pˆi
∗)− xt(pˆi∗))− (xt+1(pi∗)− xt(pi∗)) = c˜(pˆi
∗)− c˜(pi∗)
κ
δ˜t(1− δ˜){βγ − 1 + δ˜β(1− γ)}
< 0
20Note that for γ = 0, c˜ = c since βδ = bβ + 1δ .
33
Plugging the solution for inflation and output growth into the IS-equation (6) again yields
the result that nominal interest rates are uniformly lower if the inflation target is lowered:
it(pˆi
∗)− it(pi∗) < 0 (47)
If γ = 1 then xt =
1−β
κ
pit and thus pit is chosen to minimize (pit−pi∗)2 +λx(1−βκ pit−x∗)2.
Thus an immediate adjustment of inflation to the steady-state value κ
2pi∗+κλx(1−β)x∗
κ2+λx(1−β)2 is
optimal. As a consequence output and nominal interest rates also immediately adjust to
their steady-state levels. In particular, nominal interest rates are lowered when a lower
inflation target is implemented, it(pˆi
∗)− it(pi∗) < 0 for all t ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 5 in Section 2.2
The result, established in the main text, that pi is constant at piDMP implies that the output
level is constant at
xDMP =
piDMP (1− β)
κ
, (48)
and the nominal interest rate is constant at
piDMP + rn. (49)
The difference between the nominal interest rate with and without a drop in the inflation
target then equals
it(pˆi
∗)− it(pi∗) = piDMP (pˆi∗)− piDMP (pi∗) = pˆi
∗ − pi∗
1 + (1− β)λx
κ2
< 0. (50)
Proof of Results in Section 4
Minimizing the loss function (18) such that the constraints (15), (16) and (17) are fulfilled
results in the following first-order conditions:
2(pit − pi∗) + 2λw(pit + wt − wt−1 − pi∗w)
+µt(1 + βγp)− µt−1 − γpβµt+1 + χt(1 + βγw)
−χt−1 − γwβχt+1 + ψt−1/β = 0 (51)
2λw(pit + wt − wt−1 − pi∗w)− β2λw(pit+1 + wt+1 − wt − pi∗w)
−ξpµt + χt(1 + β + ξw)− βχt+1 − χt−1 = 0 (52)
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2λx(xt − x∗)− µtξpωp − χt(1 + βδ2)κw + χt+1βδκw + χt−1δκw
+ηφβψt+1 − φ(η + 1 + βη2)ψt + ψt−1/βφ(1 + βη2 − βη) = 0 (53)
ψt − 2λiit = 0, (54)
where βtµt, β
tχt and β
tψt are the Lagrange multipliers for constraints (15), (16) and (17)
respectively.
The next step is to rewrite the dynamics of this system as
zt+1 = Azt, (55)
for zt = (pit−1, pit, xt−2, xt−1, xt, wt−1, wt, µt−1, µt, χt−1, χt, it−1, it) and a matrix A.
7 equations, four first-order conditions and three constraints describe the system. As a
first step I use condition (54) to solve ψt = −2λiit and substitute ψt into the remaining 6
equations. Next I solve 6 equations – the remaining first order conditions for xt, pit and wt
and the constraints (17) for period t−1 and (15) and (16) for period t – for xt+1, pit+1, wt+1,
nt+1, µt+1 and χt+1 (Note that I, for pure mathematical convenience, shift the IS-equation
by one period).
This expresses xt+1, pit+1, wt+1, nt+1, µt+1 and χt+1 as functions of xt, xt−1 pit, wt, nt, µt
and χt. Rewriting these expressions in matrix form and adding the identities pit = pit, . . .
results in a matrix equation zt+1 = Azt. For example, the first row of A has a 1 in the
second column and zeros elsewhere. The second row is then the expression for pit+1, . . ..
Now that the dynamics are rewritten in matrix form, I can compute the eigenvalues
and eigenvectors. After plugging in parameter values, I find 6 non-explosive (different)
eigenvalues ν1, . . . ν6 and corresponding (column) eigenvectors v1, . . . v6. This is true for the
benchmark (see table 1) and all the robustness checks in section 5.
Let x¯, p¯i, w¯, i¯, µ¯ and χ¯ be the steady-state solution to the 6 equations (this means all time
indices are dropped). Set L equal to the column vector (p¯i, p¯i, x¯, x¯, x¯, w¯, w¯, µ¯, µ¯, χ¯, χ¯, i¯, i¯).
The theory of difference equation implies that there exist numbers c1, . . . c6 such that every
solution to zt+1 = Azt has the form:
zt =
6∑
k=1
ckν
t
kvk + L. (56)
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Since pit is the second entry of z, the solution for pit is the second entry of the right hand
side.
What remains to be determined are the six numbers c1, . . . c6. Plugging in the solutions
for xt, pit, wt, nt, µt and χt from (56) into the first order conditions for x0, pi0 and w0 and
the constraint (15), (16) and (17) for period 0, results in 6 equations in the 6 unknowns
c1, . . . , c6.
This gives six values c∗1, . . . c
∗
6. Note that the period 0 constraints and thus the period 0
first-order conditions are different from the period t constraints, a well-known fact from
optimal taxation (see Chari & Kehoe (1999)).
The unique solution to the optimal deflation problem then equals
zt =
6∑
k=1
c∗kν
t
kvk + L, (57)
where as before the solution for pit can be read off in row 2, the solution for xt in row 5,
the solution for wt in row 7 and the solution for it in row 13.
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Estimated Parameters for Alternative Horizons
Table 3: Parameter Values from Giannoni and Woodford (2004) estimated for different
horizons following the shock.
Horizon
6 8 12 16 20
Parameters
η 1 1 1 1 1
γp 0.937 1 1 1 1
γw 1 1 1 1 1
ξp 0.0065 0.0036 0.0020 0.0017 0.0013
ξw 0.0073 0.0056 0.0042 0.0081 0.0203
ϕ 0.5739 0.6635 0.7483 0.7769 0.7502
ωw 19.559 19.545 19.551 9.4925 4.2794
κw 0.1510 0.1167 0.0883 0.0890 0.1152
δ 0.0277 0.0318 0.0356 0.0707 0.1322
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Figure 10: Optimal nominal interest rates for a welfare weight λx = 1 and estimates based
on impulse response functions with horizons of 6,8,12,16,20 quarters following the shock.
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Figure 11: Optimal nominal interest rates for a welfare weight λx = 1 and ξp =
0.001, 0.002, 0.1. The horizontal line at 0.02 is the steady-state nominal interest rate with-
out a target change.
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Figure 12: Optimal nominal interest rates for a welfare weight λx = 1 and ξw =
0.001, 0.0042, 0.1. The horizontal line at 0.02 is the steady-state nominal interest rate
without a target change.
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Figure 13: Optimal nominal interest rates for a welfare weight λx = 1 and ϕ =
0.1, 0.7483, 10. The horizontal line at 0.02 is the steady-state nominal interest rate without
a target change.
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Figure 14: Optimal nominal interest rates for a welfare weight λx = 1 and ωw =
5, 19.551, 35. The horizontal line at 0.02 is the steady-state nominal interest rate with-
out a target change.
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Figure 15: Optimal nominal interest rates for various degrees of predeterminedness. No
predeterminedness (benchmark), a) consumption 2 periods, wages and prices 1 period, b)
consumption, prices and wages 1 period, c) consumption 1 period, wages and prices 2
periods. The horizontal line at 0.02 is the steady-state nominal interest rate without a
target change.
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Figure 16: Optimal nominal interest rates when quasi-differences xt − δxt−1 (habit) and
pit− γppit−1 and piwt − γppit−1 (indexation) enter the welfare function. The horizontal line at
0.02 is the steady-state nominal interest rate without a target change. The benchmark is
for λx = 1.
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Figure 17: Optimal nominal interest rates for a ‘classic’ loss (period) function (pit− pi∗)2 +
(xt − x∗)2. The horizontal line at 0.02 is the steady-state nominal interest rate without a
target change. The benchmark is for λx = 1.
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Figure 18: Optimal nominal interest rates for the GW-welfare specification when a) there
is no predeterminedness and b) consumption is predetermined 2 periods and wages and
prices are predetermined 1 period in advance. The horizontal line at 0.02 is the steady-
state nominal interest rate without a target change.
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